Human language is a complex communication system with unlimited expressibility. Children spontaneously develop a native language by exposure to linguistic data from their speech community. Over historical time, languages change dramatically and unpredictably by accumulation of small changes and by interaction with other languages. We have previously developed a mathematical model for the acquisition and evolution of language in heterogeneous populations of speakers. This model is based on game dynamical equations with learning. Here, we show that simple examples of such equations can display complex limit cycles and chaos. Hence, language dynamical equations mimic complicated and unpredictable changes of languages over time. In terms of evolutionary game theory, we note that imperfect learning can induce chaotic switching among strict Nash equilibria.
INTRODUCTION
Human language consists of a stream of sounds that give rise to phonemes, words, phrases, sentences, poetry and publications. Grammar is the internal computational system of language (Pinker 1990; Jackendoff 2002) . Native speakers have a subconscious internal representation of a grammar, which enables them to generate and understand sentences of their language. Children build this internal grammar by generalizing from linguistic data they receive from their speech community (Lightfoot 1991 (Lightfoot , 1999 . Languages change over time. The purpose of this research is to model language change by using tools from evolutionary game dynamics, and to use such models to gain insight into the evolution of the language faculty.
Given an unrestricted set of languages and the problem of identifying a target language based on a sequence of example sentences, no learning algorithm can guarantee that it will correctly identify every possible target in finite time (Gold 1967; Valiant 1984; Osherson et al. 1986; Angluin 1987; Vapnik 1995; Nowak et al. 2002) . Universal grammar (UG) specifies the restricted set of languages that is learnable by the human brain (Chomsky 1988) . UG is influenced by evolution; it is a consequence of the architecture of our brain, which in turn is genetically determined (Hauser 1996; Lai et al. 2001; Nowak et al. 2001) .
Languages are not static. Phonological systems tend to change systematically but unpredictably, as in Grimm's Law, which describes consonant changes from ProtoIndo-European to Germanic languages, and vowel shifts such as those taking place in English (Trask 1996) . Contact with other languages can bring about catastrophic changes in syntax. For example, the loss of case endings on nouns in Old English is thought to be due to contact with Old Norse (Lightfoot 1999) . Language change also has the potential for oscillations, such as the morphology type cycle. Languages tend to use either isolating morphology, with many small words each carrying a single piece of meaning, or agglutinating morphology, in which words consist of a stem plus many affixes carrying a single piece of meaning, or inflecting morphology, in which each affix carries many pieces of meaning. Roughly, languages tend to change from isolating to agglutinating to inflecting and back to isolating (Crowley 1998) . English, for example, has lost case endings and other forms of inflection and is changing from inflecting to isolating morphology.
Changes such as these arise through learning error, meaning that a child has acquired a grammar different from the parents'. Errors arise when the primary linguistic data fail to trigger the acquisition of the expected grammar, as may happen when the data underspecify the grammar or are inconsistent with every available hypothesis. Such data can arise from natural variation in speech and when sample sentences are drawn from multiple grammars as in language contact. Acquisition is often robust enough to ignore meaningless variation and detect the presence of multiple languages, resulting in bilingualism. However, this is not always the case, and history shows that learning errors are possible.
We would like to use mathematical models to study language change. Several different models have been proposed (Niyogi & Berwick 1996; Steels 1997; Hurford et al. 1998; Briscoe 2000; Cangelosi & Parisi 2001; Kirby 2001) . The goal of this paper is to display instances of a model developed by Nowak et al. (2001) that are as simple as possible and also exhibit change and sensitivity analogous to that observed in real languages.
THE MODEL
Let us consider a group of individuals whose UG admits a finite set of grammars G 1 , G 2 , … G n . Denote by Q ij the probability that a child learner will acquire grammar G j when exposed to sample sentences generated by a parent speaking G i . The linguistic data available to the child and the acquisition algorithm determine Q. Imperfect learning means that Q i i Ͻ 1 for at least some i, which implies that sometimes the learner will end up with a different grammar. As a simplifying assumption, the Q matrix is taken to be constant in time. Hence, it most accurately reflects scenarios such as an isolated population or one subject to a constant level of contact, and is of limited use when learning probabilities are fluctuating.
Consider a large well-mixed population where each individual speaks one of the grammars G 1 , G 2 , …, G n . The fraction of the population that speaks G i is denoted x i . We have Σ i x i = 1. The population is subject to natural selection: individuals derive a benefit from communicating successfully with each other. Let us define a pay-off matrix B, where B ij is the benefit to a speaker of G i from an encounter with a speaker of G j . The entries of this matrix may include effects such as the benefit of correct communication, cost of ambiguity, and so forth. A natural assumption is that people communicate best with others who have the same grammar. In this case, B is diagonally dominant, which implies that each grammar is a strict Nash equilibrium. With perfect learning, each language would then be an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
The fitness associated with grammar G j is the weighted average pay-off F j = Σ k B j k x k . Here, we make the simplifying assumption that communication is the dominant source of fitness, thereby incorporating selection in favour of individuals who communicate well.
The average fitness of the population is given by = Σ j F j x j . The language dynamical equation is given by
This system can be interpreted as a replicator (or game dynamical) equation (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998) with learning or mutation (Stadler & Schuster 1992 description of evolutionary dynamics (Price 1972; Page & Nowak 2002) . Equation (2.1) can also be formulated to describe competition among multiple UGs (Mitchener & Nowak 2003) .
LIMIT CYCLES AND CHAOS
As a specific example, let us consider the following payoff matrix for a case of three grammars: For each grammar, the most likely outcome of the learning process is the correct grammar, and there is one secondmost-likely outcome. As shown in figure 1a , these parameters produce stable oscillations, as learning errors in the subpopulation speaking G 1 feed into G 2 , and G 2 feeds into G 3 , and G 3 feeds back into G 1 . This cycle is suggestive of the morphology type cycle. Note that stable limit cycles such as this are impossible for three-dimensional replicator equations (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998, p. 78) . If learning becomes less accurate, then the limit cycle breaks down, resulting in a spiral sink, as shown in figure 1b.
This spiral opens the way for more complex behaviour, as it can be used to construct a period doubling cascade similar to Š ilnikov's mechanism (Guckenheimer & Holmes 1990 ): we add two more grammars, and set up the learning matrix so that the spiral sink is unstable in the new dimensions. We fix B as follows: The parameter denotes the learning accuracy of grammars G 4 and G 5 . For appropriate choices of , trajectories can escape from the middle of the G 1 , G 2 , G 3 spiral. The population slowly leaks into G 4 , then into G 5 , and back into G 1 to return to the spiral. Varying alters how trajectories escape the spiral. The result is a limit cycle in four dimensions that can undergo period-doubling bifurcations that lead to chaos, as shown in figure 2.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Much of the existing literature on language models focuses on equilibrium behaviour, modelling the fact that languages are generally stable on time-scales of about a century. By contrast, the behaviours displayed here attempt to capture two important features observed in changing languages. First, some language change arises from re-analysis and variation among speakers, and follows regular patterns; examples are lenition, vowel shifts and changes of morphology type. Thus, for time-scales on the order of several centuries, the oscillations discussed here appear to be more realistic than stable equilibria as in Mitchener (2003) . Second, language change is unpredictable and highly sensitive to perturbations. Many changes, particularly those associated with borrowed vocabulary, are triggered by language contact. The same kind of unpredictability and sensitivity is exhibited by chaotic dynamical systems.
It is known that the game dynamical equation for four or more dimensions can generate limit cycles and chaos (Stadler & Schuster 1992; Nowak & Sigmund 1993) . By contrast, the present example of chaos is not caused by game dynamics, but rather by learning errors.
Briscoe (2000) has proposed an agent-based model for language acquisition and evolution. He uses a specific detailed learning algorithm and UG motivated directly by linguistic research. With the intent of producing a more mathematically tractable model, the formulation of equation (2.1) assumes a larger population where individuallevel details influence the dynamics through aggregate effects. It would be a fascinating task to express Briscoe's model in terms of equation (2.1) and study the possible range of evolutionary dynamics.
In summary, the language dynamical equation is a game dynamical equation with learning. Here, we show that complex limit cycles and chaos can arise even for very simple choices of the pay-off and the learning matrices. In our example, we considered five languages (strategies), each of which is a strict Nash equilibrium. Pure game dynamics would have five stable equilibria corresponding to linguistically homogeneous populations. However, a carefully structured learning matrix is sufficient to induce chaos. Thus, very conservative natural choices of pay-off and learning matrices lead to deterministic chaos. Our analysis has implications for historical linguistics, language evolution and evolutionary game theory. Simple learning errors can lead to complex, unpredictable and seemingly stochastic changes in languages over time. For game dynamics, we note that imperfect learning can lead to chaotic switching among strict Nash equilibria.
